Abstract-As smarter mobile devices are increasingly adopted by the wider public, to access more diverse applications, the question of who to trust while on the move becomes a crucial one. When operating within ad-hoc type mobile networks, a trust framework is the logical solution to provide ways to distinguish the most trustworthy neighbours. This promotes reliable information transfer, promotes the use of local services and encourages content and resource sharing. This paper proposes a scheme to set up such a trust framework, based upon aggregating trust, based upon a trust decision process and upon the most trustworthy nodes. Furthermore, the impact of the trust framework is analysed by observing the evolution of trust over time, the overhead such a framework generates, and its effectiveness in limiting noncooperation and malicious intent.
INTRODUCTION
Increasing mobility together with the need to access ICT services requires some access to previously unknown local services. These local services may not be networked in a fixed topology. Various scenarios can be depicted ranging from academic base stations without access to a backbone wireless/wired carrier to disaster recovery networks in remote areas.
While the application of ad hoc networking in each specific case will have its particular requirements, very often, a case can be made that dynamically generated heads mimic real life depictions where "leaders" typically emerge in many scenarios to guide the rest. One example of such an occurrence is at trade conferences and exhibitions where organisers, exhibit and floor managers can all act as trustworthy heads around which trust clusters can form.
The work presented here demonstrates the formalisation of a trust model on a pure ad hoc network [7] . This is defined as one where joining entities are previously unknown to one another and create a self-starting network. The ad hoc network differs from other distributed systems in that its member nodes undertake to provide routing support themselves. There are no dedicated router or access nodes. The implication is that trust has to be built from a neutral stand-point. One can argue that sometimes in distributed systems including ad hoc networks, concepts akin to trust may be used to decided whether to trust or not. For example, a system may define a quality of service that a peer must provide [1] . Indeed some researchers define trust as a "metaphor" that is the direct product of how interactions within a system evolve [6] . The building of trust within the trust model therefore takes place as a direct consequence of the lessons learned from observing, and collecting observations of the behaviour of an entity, with respect to a predefined concept.
Researchers in the domain of mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) have realised that in order to enable and sustain reliable networking, trust relationships have to be formed between interacting entities. Such relationships are acquired over time as the entity's experience of its surroundings increases.
In its simplistic form and for the purpose of this paper, trust can be seen as "an inherent property in which one autonomous component cannot completely control another autonomous component but which may need to rely on one another or require some cooperation from it" [1] .
There are distinctions to be made between direct trust in which an entity utilises past interactions and knowledge to formulate an expectation of future behaviour from other entities; and indirect trust where the same entity relies on other intermediary entities in order to formulate a said expectation, based on their being part of the same "normative institution" [1] or on their recommendations. The latter generally leads to what is known as a reputation system. Such a system, operating through recommending entities, requires the presence of a centralised and trusted server to compute, store and display valid reputation information. This centralised authority is vital to such reputation systems but cannot be readily assumed to be present in the case of mobile devices. The reputation system needs to be decentralised [2, 3] such that it is accessible to entities on the move that may not have access to central repositories.
The simplest way to decentralise it is to locate the reputation system on every single entity in the system [4] . However, this may not be the most efficient way in terms of additional computational workload and overheads. As demonstrated previously [5] , a simple system for clustering nodes with one another and assigning tasks to certain supernodes poses some advantages while maintaining the integrity of the system. The use of clusters as the basis for a trust model will inherit similar benefits. From a trust perspective, clustering also enhances the likelihood of interaction and sharing of recommendations, thus providing more relevant and up to date reputation information.
The case for ad hoc networks can be made in instances where conventional networking is not available. Conventionally, mobile devices operate by locating the nearest available trusted wireless point in order to access a known wired backbone. This is typical of a wide area network and the topology involved is fairly simple. However, despite advances being made in lean computing and power conservation on mobile devices, these resources remain constrained and often nodes in a network find it preferable to operate on low energy in order to access local services. Furthermore, addressing unreliability through repeating retransmissions in a low energy network wastes precious bandwidth.
Superimposing trust on the ad hoc network therefore reinforces the transfer of information and aids in the delivery of dependable local services. One of the ways in which the success of a trust framework can be measured is via the quality of service that it can provide for members adopting it. For the purpose of this paper, the trust model presented utilises the success rate of networking requests as one of the criteria set for achieving quality of service. Investigating quality of service itself is outside the scope of this paper and will be presented in future work. However, one of the novelties of the model is the notion that low-level network attributes and behaviour can be projected to represent higher level abstraction such as trustworthiness, given the right context. In this paper we investigate the behaviour of the model with respect, to entity feedback provided for network requests, and to its ability to reflect changing circumstances, thus presenting a changing trust landscape.
II. RELATED AD HOC TRUST MODELS
In order to model a trust framework, different approaches have been used, that relate to conceptual and mathematical models, and to the confidence in implementing trust models in software. Several trust models have been formulated for the ad hoc networks. These are described below.
Schweitzer et al. proposed a method for building trust relationships and making the entities autonomous so that they were able to make decisions without referring to a central network [8] . Ren et al. proposed a distributed trust approach that claimed to build well-established trust reputation systems without relying on any predefined assumptions. Resilience towards nodes' dynamically leaving/joining and scalability were also supported [9] .
Liu et al proposed a trust model that is based upon the update of trust levels throughout a given mobile ad hoc network by the use of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that were installed on all nodes operating in the network [10] . Buchegger and Le Boudec [11] focus on the robustness of their trust method and its ability to detect false recommendations from any given node, be they erroneous accusations or undeserved praise. The motivation was that by solely relying on first hand observations a node does not make optimum use of all available information [11] .
A mechanism by Rebahi et al [12] was developed to detect malicious packet forwarding attacks. In fact, the authors perceived that trust in ad hoc networks started by detecting misbehaviours. They made some use of reputation which they defined as simply "the perception that a node has of another's intention and norms." The framework by Pirzada & McDonald addressed the issue of avoiding the need for distributed authorities for trust evaluations, through using a modified version of the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol to generate trust information passively [13] .
Rahman and Hailes proposed a general reputation-based framework that used recommendations to decrease perceived risks within a network [14] . The framework by Liu and Issarny [15] is yet another mechanism, incorporating the dimensions of time and context, for forming, evolving and propagating reputation. It also claims effectiveness in distinguishing between truth-telling and lying agents. These models all operate on the assumption that nodes do not have access to a central repository in order to generate trust information, that is, they conform to the definition of pure ad hoc networks. In the scenarios above, trust is typically depicted as reputation -the amalgamation of trust ratings from various sources on a particular entity. These aim to generate trust information by observation, in order to distinguish trustworthy nodes from those that are not. The decentralised aspect of the framework is the recurrent theme in the above examples -this is a key feature in order to apply any prospective model to an ad hoc network. Some of these models fail to recognise that it is possible to "improve the odds" of a given relationship being trustworthy by exploiting existing information during the bootstrapping phase. For example, this could be by identifying natural leaders within a specific peer group and ensure that other nodes gravitate around them.
There is also a lack of implementation of proper bootstrapping mechanisms -instead the models rely on a priori information before interactions take place. This is an assumption that poses some restrictions on the general viability of the models in different situations. Admittedly, most trust frameworks require some tailoring to their particular application, so the manifestation of such a restriction would be rare.
There is also limited evidence of the effect what having a trust framework on top of normal networking entails. While trust frameworks are typically not expected to be as demanding in resources such as cryptographic methods, they nevertheless do use up some resources and this can affect the quality of service achievable by a network. The trust framework proposed below attempts to address these findings.
III. FRANTIC: A DECENTRALISED TRUST FRAMEWORK
The proposed model here is based upon a new FRamework for Ad-hoc Networking Trust using Interacting Clusters (FRANTIC). For a trust relationship to be established, the following are required: a trustor, a trustee, a given action and a context in which to exert that trust. The model is based on clusters that interact with one another via cluster heads, effectively leading to a super cluster superimposed on the normal layer of interacting nodes. Intra-cluster communication is between nodes and the cluster-head.
A cluster is an aggregation of nodes within a particular geographical area. For the purpose of this framework, it is assumed that any node may not belong to more than one cluster. This is done to simplify the computation of reputation information from nodes, as this is done by the cluster heads. It also reduces the risk of collusion by malevolent nodes, although such a risk is not addressed in this particular paper and is the subject of further work.
Because of the tasks imparted to cluster heads, one of the main challenges is at the bootstrapping stage where the careful election of cluster heads needs to take place. Current research has focused on implementing a cluster head election process from otherwise indistinguishable nodes. Often such cluster heads can be naturally found in existing scenarios. FRANTIC aims to capitalise on such availability.
In FRANTIC, all nodes are trustors, with their respective neighbours being their trustees. Each node holds an individual trust relationship, defined by a trust metric, with its immediate neighbours (on a one-hop basis only). Trust relationships are asymmetric. This means that if a node A's trust in a node B in performing an action is 0.5 (where 0.5 is the trust metric), it does not automatically imply that node B has the same amount of trust about node A.
The trust metric evolves over time due to two factors: firstly it may rise or fall depending on new data received by the trustor and secondly, it may undergo a period of natural "decay" over time if data regarding a certain entity is not received over time. The "decay" promotes cooperation within the network as nodes are eager to gain a good reputation. The "decay" factor may be excluded from the model if high latency is expected from certain nodes, e.g., presenters at a trade fair.
In FRANTIC, the trust metric is generated from a concept akin to trust as proposed in section 1. In other words, an action is set as the yardstick via which trust is generated. All nodes are observed by their peers in relation to their success or failure in carrying out this specific action. The trust metric is therefore a measure of the reputation of a given node since the observation of nodes is reported to the cluster-head which then proceeds to assign a value to the trustworthiness of a particular node based on those observations.
The scenario depicted by the model here is that of a large exhibition centre where users are spread out over a relatively large area but at the same time are bound within a confined space (the perimeter of the exhibition centre). Because of the way exhibition centres are laid out, there is the natural tendency for clusters to be formed based on people's location. These clusters will generally be either specific stands where people congregate or areas of the exhibition centre relative to the interest of a certain section of the visiting population, e.g. car technology for some set of visitors and beauty products for another set of visitors. These can be subdivided into further segments.
There are two options for bootstrapping: a cluster-head can be naturally assumed for a given cluster (in the scenario above, this can be the exhibition manager of a particular stand, a large trustworthy client or even exhibition centre hosts), or an election can take place in order to generate a cluster head. In that case, a bootstrapping period is agreed between the nodes that found the initial ad hoc network and at the end of the period, the node with the highest reputation is the cluster head. While this may attract collusion between nodes in a cluster and introduce possible malevolence, the resources and time involved may not make this a viable proposition for would-be rogue nodes. For the purpose of this paper, the bootstrapping stage is assumed to be completed and the latter stages of trust evolution are investigated.
The operation of the cluster is as follows: every time a recommendation is received by the cluster-head regarding a member node, the cluster-head computes a new reputation and stores it in its database. This database is then circulated to cluster members and other cluster-heads within the network periodically. This ensures that nodes are aware of the most reputable members of the network at all times. The algorithms involved in the process are as follows.
Initially, when all nodes are deemed to be equal, the reputation for a given node X is given by:
where Y is any node which produces a recommendation for X. δ is the number of nodes that provided a recommendation. This statistical average provides the reputation for X. This computation is done by the clusterhead who collects recommendations T from all member nodes. T itself is calculated at node level based on the observation of the success or failure of the specific action detailed above.
It should be noted that the maximum value of T is rounded off to be 1 and the minimum value is rounded off to be zero. This means that any trust value that happens to be ≥ 1 is then rebased to 1 just like any trust value that is ≤ 0 is rebased to 0.
Further to the above algorithm for reputation as the mean of recommendations at the initial stage, a new algorithm is then applied for subsequent reputation calculations. This is because in order to make the model fair and more resilient, a higher importance is given to nodes that themselves have a higher reputation value. This means that the reputation is now a weighted average of the recommendations provided to the cluster head. (2) where I Y is the importance of Y and is simply defined as the actual reputation of Y at that point in time and β is the sum of all importances from Y 1 to Y δ .
A few rule-based defence mechanisms are also built into FRANTIC for this scenario in order to guard against malevolent and selfish nodes. The following rules are implemented by the cluster-head (the constants can always be modified to make the framework more lenient or harsher towards misbehaving nodes).
The case when the reputation of a node falls below 0.25 is considered. This is the set threshold for early corrective action. It has arbitrarily been set at 0.25 as this level is midway between a node that is completely untrustworthy (0) and one that is neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy (0.5).
Failing to stay at a reputation of 0.25 or over in FRANTIC, results in a temporary ban for that node. In practical terms, this means that the node_id of of that node is dropped from the reputation table that is sent out in reply to member nodes. The effect of this is that this node will then be barred from using the network, as it will not be considered as being part of a cluster and therefore part of the network. This is a temporary ban from the cluster head and it only lasts for a set period of n seconds. After the ban, the reputation assigned to the node is the one which it had prior to its reputation falling below 0.25. If this is not available, then the new reputation is set as 0.25 and the reputation broadcast, with the node being given the chance to redeem itself by contributing to the benefit of the network.
The case when the reputation of a node falls below 0.25 for a second time in succession is considered. This time, the node_id is deleted from all tables and the node is therefore ejected from the network and its node_id is broadcast to all adjacent cluster heads to be added to a special table for barred nodes.
The case when the reputation of a node falls below 0.1 within a defined time period 'n' is considered. This is very rare and either depicts a very selfish node or a node that has been dropping packets maliciously. The same procedure as above is employed, with no chance for the node to redeem itself.
The case when a node issues false recommendations, whether highly favourable or highly negative for another node, is considered. In order to cater for such eventualities, the cluster head keeps a record of the variation, λ, of actual trust values from individual member nodes from the overall reputation.
The standard deviation is also calculated as σ x using the following equation:
where N is the number of recommendations obtained for X (in this case: 5), sqrt denotes the square root and A to E are individual member nodes.
If any λ X value is found to be more than one standard deviation away from the mean value R X, , and also greater than a predetermined constant Z (to mitigate against the possibility of 100% trustworthiness in all nodes), then the node is marked on the black list table. This is valid for all recommendations which that particular node may make. If the difference in value exceeds the standard deviation again for a second recommendation, then the node is barred from the network.
The framework was then simulated in a network environment to demonstrate the generation of reputation and its distribution. Non-cooperation and malicious behaviour were also investigated by applying the rules set described previously.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The experiments were set up in ns-2, a discrete event simulator [16] . This provides support for simulating routing protocols over wired and wireless networks. It was used in the experiments to randomise the routing of information within the clusters. Ns-2 is a low-level simulator typically used at the network layer of the OSI model. However, its choice was appropriate in this case as it provides a controlled environment in which the routing could be observed alongside the application layer of a trust framework. The objectives of the experiments were to determine whether or not:
1. The application of the framework resulted in the generation of trust and reputation information, based on a specific targeted action such as the successful delivery of information (either routing information or distributed content) 2. The trust framework introduced an appreciable overhead into the system and the trade-off in performance was matched by the increased reliability and robustness. It should be noted that the trust management process itself does not introduce an appreciable computing overhead for the node itself, given that such computation is done at the cluster-head. The overhead is mostly in the distribution of the reputation via recommendations and cyclic updates from the cluster-head. 3. The framework was resilient to instances of noncooperation and malicious behaviour.
The experiments were to model the distribution of information at the selected exhibition centre scenario based on the cluster mechanism described previously. The distribution of information was mimicked by the transfer of data packets. These operated as an abstraction for the real information.
Objective 1 was met by performing experiments on a single cluster only in order to observe the reputation mechanism at work. Packets were routed through nodes organised in a clustered formation. A 6-node configuration was used per cluster. This was an arbitrary selectiondetermining the ideal cluster size is the subject of further work. Initially, a single cluster was used in order to verify that the framework was able to perform trust maintenance, whereby nodes could be dropped by the network for poor performance and then allowed to redeem themselves. The trust information was generated by all nodes and measured and calculated at the end of 100s cycles and plotted. In this experiment, the node is initially made to behave as a source, router and sink in order to make sure it is working properly and at the 5 th cycle is made to start dropping packets in order to lower its reputation. This happens up until the point the node passes the 0.25 threshold value for the cluster-head, at which point it receives a ban. As per the model, this is only a temporary ban that lasts for only one cycle. When the node is reintegrated into the network, its value is reset to 0.25. In its first cycle after being reintegrated, this node experiences no traffic. However, this may not necessarily mean that it is a sign of non-cooperation. It could well be because of its low reputation value, other nodes may not be keen on using it as a router. This is why in this special case, the cluster-head does not apply the decay principle as the node has only just come back from a ban. Besides, in order to apply a trust decay decrease, the cluster-head would require the difference in reputations from the previous interaction which it does not have.
The next two cycles allow the node to redeem itself by increasing its workload and therefore increasing its own reputation. The last two cycles however, it does not experience any traffic and this time the cluster-head ages its reputation by factoring in the decay principle and its reputation value is seen to fall.
In order to meet objectives 2 and 3, a second set of experiments was laid out which involved multiple clusters and the following variables were adopted: Simulation time: 1200s, Cycle time: 100s, Number of nodes: 42 (7 clusters based on prevalent configuration) Simulation area: 1000m x 1000m, Pause time: 100s, Movement: Random Waypoint Model, Nodal range: 250m Capacity: 2Mbps, Application: Constant Bit Rate (CBR), Speed: 10 m/s The simulation was carried out as required above for 1200s with varying loads of traffic through various cycles. Figure  2 pertains to the traffic through one node only within a cluster. Data was analysed at the end of each cycle as opposed to on the fly. As far as the node is concerned, it can be seen in Figure  2 that the overhead added by the trust mode by virtue of its reputation mechanism is not appreciably higher than the routing overhead.
In comparison, Figure 3 gives an indication of the routing vs. reputation overhead for the cluster-head.
As it can be seen, the reputation overhead in this case highly outweighs the routing overhead. This may seem like a gross disadvantage of being a cluster-head. However, in order to set things in perspective, the average reputation overhead of all the member nodes is then plotted in comparison. The overall reputation overhead of the clusterhead is lower than the overhead of its member nodes. This is to be expected as the cluster-head has other duties to perform and does not involve itself in routing, other than to other cluster-heads.
In order to simulate threat scenarios, the same simulation set-up is maintained with the difference being that a variable pause time is set and nodes are allowed to move according to the random waypoint model with a set speed of 10 to 20 m/s. A varying number of malicious nodes will be implemented which drop most of the data packets they are sent, typically anywhere between 80% (lower band) to 100% (higher band). This is so as not to make detection of the malicious nodes too obvious. If the malicious nodes drop all packets they are sent (routing and data packets included), then they will be weeded out of the network by the cluster-head very quickly as their reputation will rapidly fall below threshold levels within a cycle or two. Figure 4 shows that it takes roughly about 6 cycles for all rogue nodes to be properly eliminated from the network. It should be noted that it has been assumed that there is no collusion between nodes and that the malicious nodes do not drop all packets. However, these are extreme situations. Malicious nodes will often drop all packets indiscriminately resulting in a quicker ban from the network.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
FRANTIC is very effective in meeting its stated objectives, i.e. to generate, distribute and maintain trust information. The end result is having a trust network that is able to determine trustworthiness of its members at any given point in time. This makes it highly attractive for applications that need to interoperate over an ad hoc network.
Further work will focus on determining optimal cluster size settings especially regarding inter-cluster trust, election processes and other bootstrapping scenarios, including those with gateways to backbone infrastructures. Work is also being done on implementing ways to mitigate collusion. An avenue being pursued involves the use of Byzantine type fault tolerant protocols.
Different scenarios and applications call for the trust framework to be tailored to fit each application -there cannot be a universal one. An adaptive one can provide sufficient trustworthiness based upon the context in which it is required.
